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THE APPROPRIATE UNIT QUESTION IN




T is becoming increasingly dear that of the numerous problems
which complicate the practice of collective bargaining in the pub-
lic sector, none is more important than the appropriate unit question.
In the public sector as well as in private industry, determination of
the size and composition of the bargaining unit at the initial stages
of organization and recognition can be decisive of the question
of which employee organization will achieve majority recognition,
or whether any organization will win recognition. Save for the em-
ployee organization which limits its jurisdiction along narrow lines
such as the craft practiced by its members, the normal tendency may
be to request initially a unit whose boundaries coincide with the
spread of the organization's membership or estimated strength. The
public employer, on the other hand, may seek to recognize a unit in
which the no-union votes will be in the majority, or a favored em-
ployee organization will have predominant strength; or the employer
may simply seek to avoid undue proliferation of bargaining units.
The problem in the public sector, however, is of far greater
depth than the initial victory-or-defeat aspect of recognition. In the
private sector, it is clear that the scope and nature of the unit found
to be appropriate for bargaining has acted as an important deter-
minant of the union's basic economic strength-that is, its bargain-
ing over bread-and-butter economic issues. In the public sector, it
seems clear that the scope and nature of the unit found to be appro-
priate will also affect the range of subjects which can be negotiated
meaningfully, the role played in the process by the separate branches
of government, the likelihood of peaceful resolution of disputes,
order versus chaos in bargaining, and ultimately, perhaps, the suc-
cess of the whole idea of collective bargaining for public employees.
Although the appropriate unit question has received much at-
tention in the private sector during the past thirty years,' it has not
*Professional arbitrator, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. BA. 1937, University of
Rochester; LLJB. 1940, Yale University-Ed.
1. See, e.g., Grooms, The NLRB and Determination of the Appropriate Unit: Need
for a Workable Standard, 6 WM. & MARY L. REv. 13 (1965); Hall, The Appropriate
Bargaining Unit: Striking a Balance Between Stable Labor Relations and Employee
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received the same attention for public sector employees until recently.
The purpose of this Article is to focus on certain distinguishing
aspects of both the problem and the experience in the public sector,
and to discuss a possible approach or philosophy for the future. The
primary concern here is undue proliferation of units among the
large pool of blue-collar and white-collar employees in the public
service. No attempt will be made to deal with special groups such as
policemen and firemen, in which the unit question is less difficult.
Nor will I discuss the unique problems of supervisors and profes-
sional employees, such as teachers, which are sufficiently important
and complex to require separate treatment.
II. PAST TENDENCIES AND PATTERNS
Traditionally, the public employer and union have given little
thought to the appropriateness of a unit that requested recognition.
More often than not, in the years prior to the enactment of definitive
rules for recognition of public employees, a union requesting and
receiving some form of recognition was considered the spokesman
for its members-in whatever job classifications, functional depart-
ments, or physical locations they happened to be. This lenient ap-
proach was facilitated by (and perhaps had its start in) the fact that
"recognition" frequently carried no legal consequences beyond the
ability to appear before legislative or executive bodies hearing budg-
etary requests or the power to lobby with key political figures.2 Even
when recognition was followed by a procedure similar to bargaining
-including in some instances an embodiment of the bargain in a
written agreement or memorandum-little if any consideration was
given to the appropriateness of the unit being dealt with. Apart
from the obvious problems stemming from the failure to grant "ex-
clusive bargaining rights" to these early public employee units and
from the inattention to the matter of excluding supervisors from the
units representing those whom they supervise, a groundwork was
laid for the creation of illogical unit lines. All too frequently the
result was a proliferation of bargaining units. The task of changing
Free Choice, 18 W. RFs. L. RFv. 479 (1967); Maddux, Bargaining Unit Appropriateness
in National Labor Relations Board Representation Proceedings, 38 L.A. BARt BUL.
298 (1963); Note, The Board and Section 9(cX5): Multilocation and Single-Location
Bargaining Units in the Insurance and Retail Industries, 79 HARv. L. REv. 811 (1966).
2. See Norwalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 82 A.2d 482 (1951);
Miami Water Works, Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 S.2d 194 (1946);
Smith & Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping Labor Relations Law,
1965 Wis. L. Ray. 411, 423.
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this ill-conceived basis has often proved troublesome in the current
period of rule-oriented bargaining.
Nor has the enactment of rules in the past ten years invariably
led to a different pattern.3 For example, under New York City's
Executive Order 49, issued by Mayor Wagner in the late fifties,
certificates of recognition were granted for over 200 separate units,
some containing as few as two employees. The proportion of units to
number of member-employees found in New York City is perhaps
exceeded only in Detroit, where some seventy-eight separate units
have come into existence. At the federal level, marked proliferation
of units has also characterized the pattern of recognition under Exec-
utive Order No. 10,988; 4 a similar tendency seems inherent in a
number of recently enacted state legislative standards for unit de-
termination. 5
Notwithstanding this rather pessimistic summary, the past ten
years have clearly been the decisive decade for all aspects of public
sector bargaining, and this is particularly true for the specific rules
regarding unit determination. A major example of this development
occurred in 1962 with President Kennedy's promulgation of Execu-
tive Order No. 10,988. In this document, which was originally re-
garded as the federal employee's Magna Carta of labor relations, the
following general standards are specified for appropriate unit de-
termination when "exclusive" recognition is sought by a majority
organization:
Units may be established on any plant or installation, craft, func-
tional or other basis which will ensure a clear and identifiable com-
munity of interest among the employees concerned, but no unit shall
be established solely on the basis of the extent to which employees
in the proposed unit have organized.8
Another section of the Order also provides for "formal" recognition
in a "unit as defined by the agency" when an employee organization
has ten per cent of the employees as members, and no other organiza-
3. For an excellent discussion of the recent experience with the unit issue at all
levels, see A. Thomson, Unit Determination in Public Employment, part of a series
entitled "Public Employee Relations Reports," published by the New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University.
4. 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Comp.). See Barr, Executive Order 10,988: An Experi-
ment in Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service, 52 GEo. L.J. 420
(1964).
5. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-471, 10-153(b) (Supp. 1969); DEsL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 1304 (Supp. 1966); MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 423.213 (1967); Mo. Ray.
STAT. § 105.500(3) (Supp. 1968); ORE. RV. STAT. § 662.705(1) (1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 28-9.4-4 (1969); Sullivan, Appropriate Unit Determinations in Public Employee Col-
lective Bargaining, 19 MacER L. Rv. 402, 410-16 (1968).
6. Executive Order No. 10,988, § 6(a), 3 C.F.R. 521, 532-24 (1959-1963 Comp.).
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tion holds exclusive representation rights.7 Finally, another section
provides for "informal" recognition when the employee organization
does not qualify for exclusive or formal recognition, without regard
to whether other employee organizations hold one of the other
forms of recognition in the same unit.8
Regardless of whether this three-sided format was justified under
the state of recognition and bargaining then prevalent in the federal
service, there can be little question that the system was calculated to
encourage representational footholds on a mass scale within small
units. And, it did result in proliferation of units, albeit on a reduced
scale, as informal or formal recognition often led to exclusive recog-
nition. Emphasis on the "community of interest" standard in the
administration of Executive Order No. 10,988,1 and the use in some
instances of the National Labor Relations Board's technique of
the "Globe election"-a procedure in which the members of a
homogeneous occupational group are allowed to vote on separate
recognition for their own unit, as opposed to a rival organization's
request that they be included in a larger unit' 0-have undoubtedly
contributed further to widespread fragmentation of units in federal
employment.
At the state and local levels, virtually all of the significant legisla-
tion passed since 1960 has spelled out standards of some type for
unit determination. In many instances these state enactments made
possible further proliferation by adding to the existing illogical
patterns of recognition new units made possible through espousal
of the federal "community of interest" standard and its converse,
separate units for groups having "conflicting interests"; by provid-
ing for Globe-type elections or similar approaches designed to facili-
tate small unit separation; and, in the states of Delaware' and
Minnesota,'2 by permitting the government agency to rely on the
extent of employee organization. Notwithstanding the fact that some
of the state laws embody specific standards used by the National
Labor Relations Board for the private sector,13 observers familiar
with bargaining conditions in both sectors have contended that the
7. Id. § 5(a), 3 C.F.R. at 523.
8. Id. § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. at 523.
9. See Barr, supra note 4, at 430-31.
10. Globe Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1304 (Supp. 1967).
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52 (1966).
13. See generally Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment
Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MicH. L. REv. 891, 897-8, 903 (1969).
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degree of fragmentation in some of the states exceeds that of the
private sector.14
Clearly, at both state and federal levels the standards place a
high premium on the subjective judgment of the decision-making
body or individual, and results are also shaped to a high degree by
the happenstance of the petitioning organization's requested unit at
the time of the petition. Particularly when there is no rival organiza-
tional claim for a larger unit-which is often the case-the over-all
effect has been to encourage recognition of the smaller unit. Even if
a union succeeds in winning recognition in a large unit, employees
in that unit are generally not required to become members of the
union. The relative lack of union security clauses in the collective
bargaining agreements of the public service assures that, to a degree
unparalleled in the private sector, dissident small-unit groups are
able to maintain their separate identities and to prolong the battle
for break-off from the larger group's exclusive bargaining agent.
III. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE SMALL UNIT
It cannot be assumed automatically that the pattern of many small
units is wrong. A single craft, classification, department, or installa-
tion which would otherwise constitute a small minority if included
in a larger unit can argue with some justification that its specialized
interests and needs may be subordinated to the wishes of the larger
unit's majority. Moreover, the smaller unit which performs a particu-
larly essential function may also be capable of striking a better bar-
gain for itself when left to do its own negotiating.
"Community of interest" is more than a catch phrase. It not only
points up that like-situated employees will better understand their
own problems and press their unique needs, but it also recognizes
the instinct of exclusiveness which causes employees to want to form
their own organization rather than become part of a larger organiza-
tion in which they may feel themselves strangers. The desire to possess
such "freedom of choice" or "self-determination" should, it can be
argued, receive greater weight for public employees, because they
are "public," than for those in the private sector.
There is nothing inherently wrong in permitting an employee
organization to gain a foothold in a smaller unit, if the employees in
that unit select it; and, if the union is effective in the small unit, it
may grow and achieve recognition in other separate units or in a
single large unit. This consideration may be particularly significant
14. See A. Thomson, supra note 3, at 10.
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in the early period after the promulgation of legislation or executive
orders encompassing a vast group of employees whose right to repre-
sentation had not previously been formally legitimized. It is fre-
quently easier for unions to secure employees' allegiance in smaller,
distinctive groups than in larger, heterogeneous ones.
At the same time, there are important considerations which, it
seems, point toward a unique, long-range need for larger units in the
public sector. The special problems of unit determination in the
public sector were most clearly recognized legislatively in 1967 in
New York's Taylor Law, which included, in addition to the common
standards of community of interest and necessity to promote the
public welfare, the further requirement that in defining an appro-
priate unit the following standard should be taken into consider-
ation: "the officials of government at the level of the unit shall have
the power to agree, or to make effective recommendations to other
administrative authority or the legislative body with respect to, the
terms and conditions of employment upon which the employees de-
sire to negotiate ... "-15 The latter clause clearly reflects awareness
of the fact that the employer-negotiator in the public service fre-
quently has only limited authority, and that this condition will affect
the scope of bargaining. As pointed out by the New York Governor's
Committee on Public Employee Relations, 6 the picture in the pub-
lic sector is fundamentally different from that in the private sector.
In private business, the authority to bargain on all of the normally
bargainable matters is present or can be delegated, no matter what
the size or make-up of the bargaining unit. By contrast, in the public
service the necessary authority may not be delegable to lower-level
functional units; legal requirements and tradition often call for uni-
formity of certain working conditions for like categories of em-
ployees throughout the governmental entity, regardless of bargaining
unit categorization; and, even at the top of the particular level of
government involved, authority is normally divided at least three
ways-among the executive branch, the legislative branch, and a
civil service commission.
Inherent in the previously quoted section of the Taylor Law,'7
therefore, is the necessity that some consideration be given to the
nature of the subject matter sought to be bargained upon in seeking
to arrive at the appropriateness of a unit.'8 This provision of the
15. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 207(l)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
16. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York, Final
Report 15-18 (March 31, 1966).
17. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
18. Governor's Committee, supra note 16, at 25-27.
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Taylor Law also recognizes that the subject matter of bargaining
must normally be limited by the scope of the "employer's" authority
to make agreements or effective recommendations, and a likely con-
sequence is that the smaller the unit decided upon, the more re-
stricted the scope of the bargaining by that unit will be.
Apart from this inhibiting effect on the bargaining experience,
an approach which permits or favors small units makes it very difficult
to resolve other institutional complications which arise in bargain-
ing in the public service. The New York Governor's Committee, in
both its 1966 Report19 and its 1968 Report,20 pointed out the
unique importance of completing a negotiation with public em-
ployees in time to incorporate the agreement's financial essence in
the budget of the governmental unit-which, by law, generally must
be submitted to the legislature by a specified date. 21 However, many
of the annual bargaining sessions in the public sector today are
extraordinarily prolonged, starting with direct negotiation, followed
by resort to mediation and the frequently used machinery of fact-
finding or impasse panels. After all of this there may be further
extensive dealings with upper-echelon individuals or groups in the
executive and legislative branches. Thus, the sheer weight of the
process22 may lead to its breakdown if the trend toward proliferation
of bargaining units in numerous jurisdictions continues unabated.
It is noteworthy that in the City of Philadelphia23-which is fre-
quently cited as an example of well-established, peaceful, and effec-
tive bargaining at the municipal level-all employees except police-
men and firemen have been represented by a single unit for most of
the last two decades. Even with only a single unit and without use
of impasse resolution machinery, however, the experience in Phila-
delphia has been marked by many instances of abnormally prolonged
annual negotiations. The Philadelphia experience also demonstrates
the need to establish detailed liaison between the executive branch,
the legislative branch, and the civil service commission during the
19. Id. at 33-34, 39.
20. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York, In-
terim Report (June 17, 1968).
21. See generally Rehmus, Restraints on Local Governments in Public Employee
Bargaining, 67 Micn. L. REv. 919, 924-25 (1969).
22. For example, a February 27, 1968, report by an impasse panel for the unit of
Detroit police officers recommended a procedure for future bargaining. The essential
steps which the panel proposed were to extend over a period of nine months in a
particular year. Excerpts from Detroit Police Panel Report, GovT. EIPLOYEE REL.
REP. [hereinafter GERR] No. 235, at D-1, D-10 (March 11, 1968).




course of an annual bargaining program in order to minimize the
chaotic effects of overlapping authority on the government side.
While it is possible that a city the size of Philadelphia might also
have had a history of successful labor relations in the public sector
under a pattern which broke down the public employee bargaining
group into a small number of separate units, there is little question
that the success could not have been achieved under the patterns of
excessive fragmentation found elsewhere. In any event, the existence
of the single large unit clearly contributed significantly to that city's
ability to surmount effectively the institutional obstacles complicat-
ing public sector bargaining. Moreover, proliferation can and does
breed excessive competition among rival organizations. One conse-
quence of this may be a high incidence of breakdowns in peaceful
bargaining. To be sure, competition in bargaining is to some extent
unavoidable; this condition is not necessarily undesirable socially,
and will continue to characterize the experience in private and public
sector alike, regardless of the size of units involved. Nevertheless,
there is hardly a permanent justification for permitting what appears
to be a greater proliferation of bargaining units in the public sector
than that now prevailing in the private sector. The institutional
factors discussed above add a unique dimension to the task of achiev-
ing peaceful and successful bargaining in the public sector. Because
of this, and because of the likelihood that proliferation will result in
an increased number of breakdowns in the bargaining process, larger
units must become the accepted norm in the public sector.
IV. SOME SIGNIFICANT RECENT EXPERIENCES
A number of specific case histories furnish valuable insight into
both the unit determination problems posed in the public service
and the steps which may be taken to resolve those problems. For
example, the Post Office Department, whose employees had long been
members of various employee organizations, was faced with problems
of unprecedented magnitude and complexity in formalizing its bar-
gaining structure under Executive Order 10,988. The approach
decided upon was to establish one set of appropriate bargaining units
at the national level for national issues, another set at the regional
level for regional issues, and a third set of 24,000 units at the local
level for local issues. 24 Separate representational procedures were
24. Postmasters have recently voiced some dissatisfaction with this solution, since a
union which is unsuccessful in obtaining a desired provision at the local level may
try again at the regional and national levels. GERR No. 265, at A-3, A-4 (1968).
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instituted to select majority bargaining agents at each level, and
subsequently bargaining agreements were entered into at each level
encompassing the issues pertinent and bargainable at that level. At
the national level, it should be added, a single joint agreement was
reached with seven separately designated exclusive bargaining
agents.2 5
Under the above format, an employee who has one bargaining
agent at the local level may be represented by rival organizations at
the higher levels; there are, in fact, at least eleven examples of "triple
representation" for a particular craft or grouping in the Post Office
Department.2 However, the disadvantages of this condition appear
to be outweighed by the practical value of this highly innovative
technique designed to permit maximum bargaining under extremely
difficult circumstances. On the one hand, the solution affords a high
degree of local "self-determination"; at the same time it recognizes
the significant principle that, in establishing bargaining units in the
public sector, attention must be given to the relationship between
the subjects sought to be included in the bargaining and the degree
of meaningful "employer" authority to bargain with the proposed
unit. Moreover, when issues arise that affect the Post Office Depart-
ment on a national scale, the ability of the seven designated national
bargaining agents to enter into a joint agreement greatly minimizes
the normal institutional difficulties indigenous to public sector bar-
gaining.
Regardless of whether this hierarchical arrangement proves a
lasting success for the Post Office, there seems to be little question
that the technique may not be feasible for the federal service as a
whole, and that the long-run solution to the existing problem of
proliferation probably lies in a simple movement toward larger and
fewer units. In fact, there is now some evidence to indicate the be-
ginnings of a trend toward consolidation of bargaining units in some
of the federal agencies. 27 An additional step which would also help
to avoid undue proliferation of bargaining units in the future would
be to amend Executive Order No. 10,988 to exclude the possibility
25. The seven unions are the Natl. Assn. of Letter Carriers, the Natl. Assn. of
Post Office & Gen. Service Maintainance Employees, the Natl. Assn. of Post Office
Mail Handlers, Watchmen, Messengers & Group Leaders, the Natl. Assn. of Spec.
Delivery Messengers, the Natl. Fed. of Post Office Motor Vehicle Employees, the Nati.
Rural Letter Carriers Assn., and the United Federation of Postal Clerks. GERR No.
212, at A-5 (Oct. 2, 1967).
26. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON POSTAL ORGANIZATION, TowARDs POSTAL EXCELNCE
118 (1968).
27. Letter to the author dated July 8, 1968, from Louis S. Wallerstein, Chief,
Division of Federal Employee-Management Relations, U.S. Dept. of Labor.
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of any further "informal" recognitions and to raise the minimum
required membership for "formal" recognition in a unit.28
Another interesting development is taking place in New York
City. With the creation of the Office of Collective Bargaining,2 9 New
York City began to consolidate its bargaining units through tech-
niques such as recognition by citywide job classifications.30 This
transition was followed, in the spring of 1968, by the truly basic step
of recognizing one exclusive bargaining agent for all the employees
of the mayoral agencies31 for purposes of those citywide working
conditions which are required to be uniform for such employees. 82
Separate representation in smaller units continues for purposes of
other issues, and this condition is no doubt prolonging the same
problems that are found elsewhere; but the basic trend appears to be
a salutary one.
A third experience of interest involves the employees of the
State of New York. Prior to the enactment of the Taylor Law, which
defined the first set of rules for bargaining by both state and local
government personnel, the majority of the state's 124,000 employees38
had belonged to the statewide Civil Service Employees Association
(CSEA)-an organization which, at least in its earlier years, had
shunned the concept of formalized collective bargaining.34 Following
enactment of the Taylor Law, the state, as employer, recognized the
CSEA as the bargaining agent for a "general unit" of all the em-
ployees.3 5 After nearly a year of bargaining by this unit, the Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB), the state agency charged with
administering the Taylor Law,86 received petitions challenging the
appropriateness of the general unit.3 7 In opposition to the CSEA,
28. A presidential review commission appointed in 1967 has suggested such an
amendment. Under this proposal, the minimum required membership for "formal"
recognition in a unit from its present ten per cent [Executive Order No. 10,988, § 5(a),
3 C.F.R. at 523 (1959-1963 Comp.)] to thirty per cent. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1968,
at 28, col. 3.
29. The office was established by Local Law of the City of New York No. 53, GERR,
No. 205, at E-1 to E-10 (Aug. 14, 1967).
80. See, e.g., the decisions on certification reported in GERR No. 253, at B-2, B-3
(July 15, 1968).
31. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
32. Id. See also Editorial, Milestone in Municipal Labor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1968,
at 36, col. 1.
33. The figure does not include approximately 3,500 state police and approximately
10,000 employees of state universities. GERR No. 219, at B-7 (Nov. 20, 1967).
34. See Governor's Committee, supra note 16, at 11-12.
35. GERR No. 219, at B-7 (1967).
36. N.Y. Crv. Saav. LAW § 205 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
37. Immediately after the Governor recognized the CSEA as exclusive bargaining
agent, the Public Employment Relations Board issued an order withholding recogni-
tion of the CSEA pending the Board's disposition of petitions by other employee
[Vol. 67:1001
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twelve separate employee organizations requested recognition in
twenty-five different bargaining units.3 The proposed units were
drawn along highly diverse occupational, departmental, or installa-
tion lines.30
Shunning the extremes of either one general unit or twenty-five
separate units, the PERB ruled in favor of five separate statewide
negotiating units and directed elections to determine the majority
agent in each of those units.40 The units were constituted along
lines cutting across departments; instead, the employees were
grouped into families of occupations primarily on the basis of func-
tion and training. In denying the requested continuance of the gen-
eral unit, the PERB adopted an earlier finding of its Director of
Representation 4' regarding the unit's inconsistency with the "com-
munity of interest" standard of the law42 and, noting that the em-
ployees were divided among ninety occupational groupings, encom-
passing more than 3,700 separate job classifications, held: "The
enormity of this diversity of occupations and the great range in the
qualifications requisite for employment in these occupations would
preclude effective and meaningful representation in collective nego-
tiations if all such employees were included in a single unit."48 On
the other hand, the PERB concluded that accepting the opposite
extreme of twenty-five separate units would foster a proliferation of
small groups and would cause "unwarranted and unnecessary ad-
ministrative difficulties" which "might well lead to the disintegra-
tion of the State's current labor relations structure. ' 44 In addition
to these policy considerations, the PERB relied upon the provision
of the Taylor Law requiring that the bargaining unit be "compatible
with the joint responsibilities of the public employer and public
employees to serve the public. " 45 This standard, the PERB deter-
mined, "requires the designation of as small a number of units as
organizations. GERR No. 221, at B-1 (Dec. 4, 1967). The CSEA petitioned to vacate that
order and, although the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court, CSEA v. Helsby,
55 Misc. 2d 507, 285 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1967), it was upheld, and the order vacated, on
appeal, CSEA v. Helsby, 29 App. Div. 2d 196, 286 N.Y.S.2d 956, affd., 21 N.Y.2d 541,
236 N.E.2d 481, 289 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1968).
38. See In re State, GERR (PERB 1968) No. 279, at G-1, G-1 to G-3 (Jan. 13, 1969),




41. In re State, GERR (PERB 1968) No. 262, at E-1 (Sept. 16, 1968).
42. Id. at E-8.
43. In re State, GERR (PERE 1968) No. 279, at G-l, G-8.
44. Id.
45. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 207(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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possible consistent with the overriding requirement that the em-
ployees be permitted to form organizations of their own choosing"
in order to achieve meaningful representation. 46
The PERB did not make specific reference to the statutory stan-
dard requiring consideration of a requested unit in terms of the
employer-agency's existing authority to deal effectively with possible
bargaining subject matter within such a unit.47 There seems to be
little question, however, that the size and nature of the five desig-
nated statewide units insure adequate authority, on the side of the
state's negotiating representatives, to make meaningful agreements
or recommendations with respect to a large portion of the substantial
issues normally deserving of consideration in an effective collective
bargaining relationship. Moreover, since the employees were geo-
graphically dispersed and because the general unit presented serious
problems of providing direct representation, the PERB's breakdown
of the employees into five large families of jobs probably maximizes
the possibilities for self-determination and adequate union respon-
siveness in representing the various segments within each family.
The New York experience is also noteworthy because the direct
confrontation between the two opposite extremes presented by the
requested patterns at the inception of newly formalized public
sector collective bargaining afforded an opportunity to weigh the
basic implications of excessive fragmentation. In contrast to pol-
icy makers in cities like New York and Detroit and in some of
the departments at the federal level, the New York State PERB
was able to adopt a coherent policy at a time when the damage had
not yet been done. At the same time, the Board's decision rejected a
monolithic bargaining unit which would have been neither proper
nor realistic for public employees at this stage of history.
V. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing examination of some of the problems and
practical experience associated with the appropriate unit issue in
the public service, it seems relatively clear that the answer, at least
for the present, cannot lie in "instant" creation of large single bar-
gaining units, however desirable that solution might be from the
standpoint of administrative convenience. Even in the near-Utopian
example presented by Philadelphia, separate units have always
existed for the police and fire departments. Moreover, the present
46. GERR No. 279, at G-l, G-4.
47. N.Y. Civ. Smv. LAW § 207(i)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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single large unit for Philadelphia's civilian employees was preceded
by a period of unit recognition along department lines, with several
employee organizations representing or claiming to represent the
employees. In any event, the unit problems in the public service are
altogether too new and different to permit any simple solutions at
this stage; it seems clear that a considerable period of trial-and-error
lies in store.
Nevertheless, there is sufficient experience to warrant the twin
conclusions that there has been too much fragmentation of public
employee bargaining units thus far, and that this condition will
inhibit the evolution of orderly collective bargaining arrangements
for the future. Apart from the details in individual cases, I believe
that a basic philosophy is required which will generally favor larger
units rather than smaller units. The special problems of the public
service call for such an approach, to a significantly greater extent
than in the private sector. The available evidence also reveals that
this basic philosophy is not being implemented, except in isolated
instances such as the above-described decision by the Public Employ-
ment Relations Board in New York. Unfortunately, the general
tendency has been in the opposite direction, particularly when the
freedom-of-choice argument has been given special weight in light
of the "public" nature of the employment.
The problem might also be viewed as a two-stage phenomenon,
however. Given the fact that basic bargaining authorization was
often granted almost overnight to a large mass of employees who were
essentially nalve and inexperienced regarding collective bargain-
ing, and given the further fact that these were public employees,
the marked initial tendency toward small units was perhaps under-
standable. It was reasonable to expect that employee organizations
which were suddenly permitted to engage in bargaining over a
large number of problems for the first time would seek to establish
their powers in small units; perhaps it was also reasonable that, from
a public policy viewpoint, the employees who were encountering a
new experience in labor relations were afforded an initial period of
familiarization through comfortable association with their counter-
parts in small groups.
Nevertheless, because we have long since entered and in some
instances passed through such a stage, the question arises as to what
the second stage should be. Fragmentation into too many small units
can severely limit the scope of bargaining subject matter, and that
in turn might defeat the basic bargaining right. Although the three-
tier bargaining pattern used by the Post Office Department was
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fashioned at an initial stage of recognition, it may warrant serious
consideration elsewhere as a second-stage process capable of balancing
the twin necessities of providing freedom of choice for employees
and accommodating the practical realities of bargaining in the public
sector. Similarly, the hierarchical, multiunion structure of bargain-
ing found under the Whitley Councils in England 48-a system
which great4y resembles the Post Office pattern-warrants serious
study in this country, particularly for employees of extremely large
entities such as some of the federal departments or the government
of an entire state.
At the state level, the evolution of larger bargaining units still
remains quite speculative. Even in New York, the previously men-
tioned decision of the Public Employment Relations Board may
represent only a tentative initial step; numerous problems affecting
the structure of bargaining probably still lie in store there. Assum-
ing that the PERB's decision is not reversed in the courts, and that a
number of separate employee organizations win bargaining rights
in the units decided upon, the question of how statewide issues
such as pensions and other matters requiring uniform treatment
should be negotiated by the separate bargaining agents will remain
to be solved. At this time it does not appear that New York State
could turn to the hierarchical structure of the Post Office, and for
various reasons such as history, it is also unlikely that the Post Office
model would have been feasible for the state, at least initially.
Another possible approach which hase been suggested, at the fed-
eral, state, and local levels, is the concept of "council," "joint," or
"coalition" bargaining. This is a procedure in which the separate
bargaining agents within a governmental entity bargain jointly with
the governmental employer on all agency-wide issues. This approach
has been practiced successfully in several governmental entities,
notably in the Tennessee Valley Authority and in the City of Cincin-
nati, Ohio. Interestingly, the technique of coalition bargaining is
currently being urged more extensively by unions in the private
sector because it would provide them greater economic strength-
and, for the same reason, it is also being strenuously resisted by pri-
vate employers. 49 Nevertheless, the special problems in the public
sector make it clear that the approach should be given extensive
consideration by both government and public employees. There
48. See generally INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN 29, 242-44, 331-36 (1954).
49. See, e.g., Abelow, Collective Bargaining: A Management View, 21 VAND. L. RE,.
39 (1968); Loomis & Herman, Management's Reserved Rights and the NLRB-An
Employer's View, 19 LA. L.J. 695 (1968).
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are obvious difficulties and disadvantages in such a solution; for
example, the larger organizations in the coalition may dominate
the smaller in determining the types of package settlements to be
agreed upon, or, conversely, the smaller members may exercise
undue influence if veto power is vested in them. Nevertheless, the
concept has apparently worked in the few places where it has been
adopted, and it may be that in the long run this will prove to be the
most feasible reconciliation of the conflict between freedom of
choice and the realities of bargaining in the public service. Another
possible solution may lie in some type of merger or federation of the
several employee organizations operating at a particular govern-
mental level. Given the recognized unions' strong desire to maintain
separate identities, however, it does not appear likely that such basic
organizational changes will occur within the predictable future.
At the level of local government, a special set of factors stemming
from the narrower geographical confines of the governmental unit
may affect possible future development of larger employee units.
Particularly for small and middle-size cities and towns, there is every
reason to seek establishment of an extremely small number of sep-
arate bargaining units, preferably constituted along the lines of
the Philadelphia pattern. Different interests of separate employee
groupings can be reconciled within a large unit much more effec-
tively at that level than at the state or federal levels. And, the prob-
lems attributable to proliferation can have a substantially more
destructive impact within these smaller units of government.
New York City, while it is an extreme case, probably is more
representative than Philadelphia of the kinds of actual and potential
labor relations problems of the large city, where the sheer numbers
of employees can offset the advantages of single geographical unit.
The current pattern of dual representation in New York, in which
heterogenous employee groups are subsumed into a single unit of ci-
vilian employees for purposes of citywide issues, has not resolved the
problems caused by separate representation for smaller units on
basic wage issues. A recent impasse panel in New York City, con-
fronted with serious wage inequity problems resulting from separate
unit representation within the same job series, has recommended
future use of "corollary" bargaining (discussed earlier as council,
joint, or coalition bargaining) by the separate bargaining agents,
so as to establish and preserve fairness in the interrelationships of
wages. 50 Some type of coalition pattern may yet be required in New
50. Impasse Panel 1-14-68, Office of Collective Bargaining, City of New York, Re-
port, Dec. 10, 1968.
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York for issues such as wages, while the citywide unit may be pre-
served for resolution of general problems like pensions. This varia-
tion on the alternatives previously discussed may not prove feasible;
it may well be that some totally different approach will hold the
answer for New York and other large cities.
At the same time, the changes that have already taken place in
New York and elsewhere emphasize both the unavoidable difficulty
of the problems of unit determination in the public service, and the
current overriding need to move from the initial stage of many small
units to a pattern of consolidation and merger. Whether consolida-
tion can be achieved only for certain types of issues, whether it is
potentially more inclusive, or whether consolidation in some other
form evolves, the basic change in direction seems unavoidable if col-
lective bargaining is to prove meaningful and successful for large
areas of the public service.
